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Abstract: We set up a model of economic and demographic long-run de-
velopment, with land and human capital as production factors, and inequality
in income and reproductive success (in the form of polygynous mating) playing
a central role. The model generates a slow and gradual compression of the in-
come gap between landholders and landless, together with rising levels of human
capital. This process spurts at some stage, as society endogenously transits into
sustained growth. Simultaneously, inequality in income and reproductive success
drops; society becomes monogamous.
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￿polygyny has tended to disappear in response to egalitarian values
￿ not values of equality between the sexes, but equality among men.￿
Robert Wright (1994, p. 98)
￿What put an end to polygyny? Democracy. Power is ￿ as it
always was ￿ a means to sex. [...] For a few million years, we hunted
or scavenged for a living, and lived in fairly free democracies. Then,
for the last few thousand years, many of us farmed for a living, and
lived in despotisms. The tide turned, [starting] in England, in the last
few hundred years. Despotism gave way, again, to democracy. And
polygyny started to give way to monogamy.￿
Laura Betzig (2002, p. 85)
The aim of this paper is to formulate a uni￿ed theory of economic and de-
mographic long-run development of human societies, where the focus is on the
interaction between class structure and reproduction. The underlying hypothesis
is that the spurt in growth rates in living standards that started in Western Eu-
rope a couple of hundred years ago had something to do with increasing equality
in income and power between men, the invention of democracy, and the rise of
monogamy.
This theory has three elements. The ￿rst element is the presence of two
sources of income: land and human capital. Land is excludable, and can be
concentrated into the hands of a small group of agents. Human capital is more
evenly distributed, due to knowledge spillovers. For modelling purposes, we let
human capital be completely evenly distributed, i.e. a non-rivalry public good.
(This is not crucial; what matters is that human capital is always more equally
2distributed than land.) As a result, societies where land is the major source of
income tend to have a less equal income distribution than societies where human
capital is more important.
The second element involves diﬀerential reproductive success across men
(i.e., rich men having more oﬀspring), and heritability of status from father to
son (i.e., rich men￿s sons fare better than those of poor men). That reproductive
success diﬀers between men is well documented: in polygynous1 s o c i e t i e si ti sr i c h
and powerful men who have more wives and thus more oﬀspring; in monogamous
societies the rich and powerful tend to father more illegitimate children than poor
men.
It is also generally true that the father￿s status aﬀects his oﬀspring. Most
obviously this holds for legitimate children who stand a chance of inheriting, but
even illegitimate children bene￿t from the father￿s status. For example, slaves
fathered by the slavemaster tend to be better treated than other slaves, and more
likely freed.
In our model, reproductive success diﬀers between landholders and landless.
Thus, in every period proportionally more agents tend to be fathered by landown-
ers than by landless. And having a father who is a landowner makes it easier for
an agent to enter the landholding class.2 As a result, the landholding class slowly
gets larger over time.
As a third element of this theory we let the accumulation of human capital
depend on the number of people engaged in research, intellectual exploration, etc.
1Polygyny means that one man can take several wives. The term polygamy formally includes
polyandry, meaning that a woman can take several husbands, which is extremely rare.
2The practice of letting only one son inherit (so-called primogeniture) is consistent with how
we set up the model. We do not assume that every son of a landowner inherits the father￿s class
status. Rather we assume a ￿leakage￿ eﬀect: at least one son inherits his father￿s status, and
among the remaining sons a small exogenous fraction do so too; the rest become landless.
3￿ for short, call it thinking. We want to capture the idea that, in history, thinking
has been the privilege of the rich. There are many ways to model this: we could
e.g. let thinking be a consumption good which agents demand more of when
earning more. To keep things simple we just postulate that an agent becomes a
thinker if his income exceeds some exogenously given threshold.
In societies where human capital is low the landless (whose only income, recall,
is from human capital) cannot aﬀord to think. Landholders may aﬀord to think,
depending on how productive land is and how many agents share the landhold-
ings. If land is unproductive, and/or split up between many landholders, each
landholder will be poor, and no agents will be thinkers. If land instead is concen-
trated into the hands of only a few agents these landholders may be rich enough
to become thinkers. In that sense, some inequality is needed for human capital
accumulation to get started.
Consider thus a society with a very unequal land distribution. Being few to
share the fruits of the land, the landholders are much richer than the landless,
and thus have more oﬀspring. As the landowning class expands more agents
become thinkers, and the level of human capital gradually increases. This raises
the income also of the landless (since human capital is a public good, recall). At
some stage human capital reaches a critical level above which also landless agents
become thinkers, so the set of thinkers suddenly comes to include all agents in
the economy. This creates a jump in human capital productivity, pushing the
economy to sustained growth in human capital: an industrial revolution. This
could capture the rise in public schooling in England from 1830 and onwards
(Matthews et al. 1982, Ch. 4; Galor and Moav 2004).
The process leading up to sustained growth is characterized by shrinking in-
come gaps between landholders and landless. Mirroring this trend the degree of
diﬀerential reproductive success declines over time: society becomes more monog-
4amous. As human capital growth spurts, income gaps disappear, and society
becomes fully monogamous. We argue that this ￿ts well with the historical evi-
dence. Anthropologist Laura Betzig argues that polygynous mating (as opposed
to polygynous marriage) died out close to the 20th century. Such a late timing
discounts other explanations (for example, that the Church made Europe monog-
amous) but ￿ts well with a marked decline in income inequality and the birth of
democracy.
We also allow human capital to aﬀect mortality rates and the quantity-quality
choice in children. This enables our model to replicate a demographic transition:
mortality falls before fertility rates, and population growth rates spurt in between.
Moreover, the rise in per-capita income growth is initially accompanied by a rise in
population growth before the two diverge. The model thus replicates a so-called
post-Malthusian phase of development, preceding the transition into sustained
growth, consistent with the European experience (see e.g. Galor and Weil 2000;
Lagerl¤ of 2003a).
But this is not a unique scenario. A society starting oﬀ with an unequal land
distribution may instead follow a path where the expanding size of the landholding
class dilutes each landholder￿s income, so much that their incomes eventually fall
below the threshold for thinking. Human capital then suddenly drops, as all
thinkers vanish, and the economy slowly converges back to an egalitarian hunter-
gatherer state. This captures the downfall of an early civilization. Which path
the economy follows depends on e.g. land productivity.
Our work adds to (and borrows from) various ￿elds of literature, but three
groups of papers can be singled out as more central. First, there is a recent
upsurge of papers on long-run growth, trying to understand e.g. the industrial
revolution or the demographic transition.3 We share with most of these an element
3An incomplete list would include Jones (2001), Lucas (2002, Ch. 5), Galor and Weil (2000),
5of endogenous human capital investment and fertility, and a general ambition to
explain the same historic growth patterns. However, none of these analyzes the
growth implications of diﬀerential reproductive success.4
Second, our paper relates to a literature on polygyny. Some early, but more
micro oriented, contributions (Becker 1991; Bergstrom 1994a,1994b; and Guner
1999, Section 5.2) do not study growth, or try to explain why polygyny died out.
Edlund and Lagerl¤ of (2002) discuss growth and polygyny, but treat polygyny as
an exogenous institution. Tertilt (2003) explains, inter alia, cross-country income
gaps in the world today in a model with polygyny, fertility, and saving. As Edlund
and Lagerl¤ of (2002) she treats polygyny as exogenous.
Our way of thinking about polygyny is close in spirit to Gould, Moav and
Simhon (2003), who explain ￿the mystery of monogamy￿ (i.e., the practice of
monogamy in unequal societies) by thinking of it in terms of a quality-quantity
trade-oﬀ in children. If mothers are important for children￿s quality, and if men
prefer quality over quantity, then men may prefer one wife of high quality over sev-
eral wives of low quality. Monogamy may thus arise at equilibrium as a voluntary
choice of men, despite income inequality.5 Moreover, it is in societies where in-
Galor and Moav (2002), Lagerl¤ of (2003a,b), and Tamura (2001). Other related work abstract
from demographics, and thus do not try to explain the demographic transition, e.g., Goodfriend
and McDermott (1995) and Hansen and Prescott (2002).
4Galor and Moav (2002) is an exception. They model the role played by diﬀerential re-
productive success in the selection of genetically heritable traits (preferences for high quality
oﬀspring, versus high quantity). We rather model the heritability of class status.
5A similar point is discussed informally by Becker (1991, p. 95) who suggests that ￿[a]s
societies have become more urbanized and developed over time, families have greatly reduced
their demand for ￿quantity￿ of children and greatly raised their demands for education, health,
and other aspects of the ￿quality￿ of children. [...] Since the marginal contribution of men
to quality is much greater than quantity, our analysis predicts correctly that the incidence of
polygyny has declined substantially over time.￿
6come inequality is generated by inequality in human capital (and not in e.g. land)
that rich and otherwise potentially polygynous men choose monogamy. This is
not because human capital is more equally distributed than land (as we assume
here), but because human capital makes it cheaper to produce high-quality oﬀ-
spring. In contrast to Gould et al. (2003), we do not think of modern monogamy
as a mystery in the ￿rst place: we think monogamy arose because society became
more equal (or more democratic). Ours is not an exhaustive explanation, but
should be seen as complementary to the mechanism of quality-quantity substitu-
tion captured by Gould et al. (2003).6
There is also a third set of papers on growth, class structure, and ownership of
production factors. Some focus on the roles played by physical and human capital
for inequality in the course of industrialization (Galor and Moav 2003, 2004), or
on landownership and human capital (Galor, Moav and Vollrath 2003). (See also
further references therein.) Some also link land inequality to democracy: Bertoc-
chi and Spagat (2003), for example, assume a threshold for wealth, below which
agents are not allowed to vote. None of these talk about diﬀerential reproductive
success. Our modelling approach is also more ￿black-boxed,￿ but the mentioned
papers show that there are richer ways of modelling the same mechanisms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Next, Section 2 outlines some of
the facts we want to explain. Section 3 starts setting up the model, describing the
structure of landholdings and population, budget constraints and preferences, the
concept of thinkers, and the gender dimension of the model. Section 4 illuminates
the dynamics in a phase diagram, and gives some numerical examples to illustrate
6Another diﬀerence is that Gould et al. (2003) use a static setting, whereas we use a fully
dynamic uni￿ed growth framework. Our ambition is not only (or primarily) to explain the rise of
monogamy, but to argue that the changes in the class structure that mirrored rising monogamy
had something to do with the take oﬀ to sustained growth.
7the workings of the model. Section 5 ends with a concluding discussion.
2. The facts
2.1. Economic and demographic long-run trends
Human history has been characterized by mostly slow changes in population and
living standards. It was only a couple of hundred years ago that Western Europe
entered an era of sustained growth in per-capita incomes, known as the industrial
revolution. This was associated with equally dramatic demographic changes: ￿rst
declining mortality, later falling birth rates, and in between a phase of rapid
population expansion ￿ a process known as the demographic transition. (See
Figure 2.1.)
Note that growth in population and per-capita income increased simultane-
ously for many years. This is sometimes referred to as the post-Malthusian phase
of development, falling in between the ￿nal stage of modern growth, and the pre-
ceding, Malthusian, stage (Galor and Weil 2000). Another empirical regularity of
the peak in population growth during the demographic transition is that mortality
rates fell before birth rates (see e.g. Jones 2001 and Livi-Bacci 1997).
2.2. Diﬀerential reproductive success
The most eﬀective way for rich and powerful men to father many oﬀspring is
to mate with many women, i.e., to mate polygynously. An authority on how
men throughout human history have achieved this is anthropologist Laura Betzig.
Across human societies she has found that measures of polygyny are positively
correlated with measures of despotism and hierarchy (Betzig 1986). For instance,














Figure 2.1: Annual growth rates in Western Europe. Sources: Maddison (1982,
T a b l e1 . 2 ;a n d1 9 9 5 ,T a b l eG ) .T h ey e a r sa r ec h o s e na sm i d p o i n t so ft h ep e r i o d s
reported.
9Betzig has also examined the six ￿pristine￿ civilizations on earth, located in
Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, India, South America (the Incas), and Mesoamerica
(the Aztecs). (Pristine here means that they developed largely independently
of each other and of later civilizations, so they can be thought of as natural
experiments.) These societies were all highly unequal and despotic, and also had
a very unequal distribution of reproductive resources, women: multiple wives
and/or sex partners was the privilege of the ruling classes (Betzig 1993).
Betzig also documents polygynous mating in the Roman Empire, where rich
men e.g. bought and held female slaves for sexual services (Betzig 1992). In
medieval Europe the rich and powerful among both laymen and clergy ￿ who
were monogamously married and nominally celibate, respectively ￿ could father
many illegitimate children (Betzig 1995). The same pattern continued up until
modern England, where rich men often had sex with their household servants,
who tended to be young unmarried females. Another technique was to access
married women by bribing their husbands (Betzig 2002).7
This should come as no surprise. Natural selection has designed males to strive
for as many mating partners as possible, and they use whatever means, power and
resources they have to conquer women. In all societies ￿ whether they tolerate
explicitly polygynous marriage or not ￿ it is the richest and most powerful high-
status men who have more sex partners. (This also holds in modern societies; see
e.g. Perusse 1993.) As a corollary, more inequality in income and power tends
to come with more inequality in the distribution of women, i.e., more polygynous
mating. The observation that hunter-gatherers are more monogamous can thus
be explained by the fact that they are more equal: an unequal income distribution
requires some sort of surplus and in these societies, where most men live at the
7In fact, rich men￿s reproductive advantage need not have been only illegitimate. Clarke and
Hamilton (2003) ￿nds that wealthy men in 17th century England had more legitimate children.
10same subsistence level we see small gaps in income and power (see e.g. Wright
1994, p. 94).
What is surprising is not that unequal societies historically have been polyg-
ynous, but that most of the world today has so huge gaps in incomes but is
still mostly monogamous. This is what Gould et al. (2003) call ￿the mystery of
monogamy.￿ The richest man in the world keeps only one wife at a time. He may
re-marry, and/or keep mistresses ￿ so-called serial monogamy ￿ but even in a life
time no man alive today has monopolized thousands of women, as did the rulers
in early human civilizations. Why?
2.2.1. We are more equal today
In a general sense, it seems that rich men today are somewhat more restricted with
regards to what they can do with their wealth. The democratic control exercised
by the state over even the richest men discounts the value of their wealth in power
terms. For instance, Bill Gates cannot hire an army to force the U.S. Congress to
pass laws to his liking. (He would probably lose his wealth trying anyhow, and
maybe his life.) In that sense, the eﬀective income distribution seems much more
equal today than in those early ￿pristine￿ civilizations.
We do not think this is farfetched. In her most recent work, on polygyny
in England, Laura Betzig herself links the rise of monogamous mating to the
rise of democracy (Betzig 2002; see also the citations in the introduction). A
central point that Betzig makes is that rich and powerful men continued to mate
polygynously long after Europe had begun to marry monogamously (e.g. Betzig
1995, 2002). Of course, mating is harder to measure than marriage, but we can
say something. As mentioned, one way in which rich and powerful English men
achieved polygynous mating was to hire women as household servants. Betzig
documents a downward trend in the number of household servants held by the
11English upper classes; after a longer gradual decline the institution died out in
the 20th century. This came simultaneously with a decline in the powers of the
King, and we can also see a longer downward trend in the estimated number of
children illegitimately fathered by the Kings of Britain. One can discuss the exact
timing but these changes did not come with the spread of Christianity, or as the
Church established its powers, as one may think, but closer to the 20th century,
around the time of the gradual rise of democratic institutions ￿ and surprisingly
parallel with a marked increase in income equality.
The little we know about trends in the long-run income distribution indicate
that we are more equal today than in polygynous times. Looking at British
income data Soltow (1968) ￿nds a declining trend from the 1400￿s up until today,
accelerating in the 20th century. (Champernowne and Cowell 1998, Ch. 3 sum up
other evidence painting a similar picture.) Fogel (2000, Ch. 4) presents data over
a number of measures from the 20th century U.S. and Europe, where improved
equality shows up in the Gini ratio for the income distribution; in homelessness;
a n di nc l a s sd i ﬀerences in life expectancy, stature, and weight. Two-thirds of the
reduction from 1700 to 1973 in the Gini ratio for England took place in the 20th
century (Fogel 2000, p. 143).
F o g e l ￿ ss u g g e s t e de x p l a n a t i o nf o rt h er e d u c t i o ni ni n e q u a l i t yi nt h e2 0 t hc e n -
tury is also consistent with the mechanism driving our model: ￿The factor ac-
counting for most of the reduction that has so far been achieved in the inequality
of the income distribution is the decline in the relative importance of land and
physical capital, and the increasing importance of human capital (labor skills), in
the process of production￿ (Fogel 2000, p. 157). Notably, Fogel downplays the
importance of e.g. government programs. Soltow (1968, p. 29) makes essentially
the same point, suggesting that to ￿a continued widening of opportunity of the
non-propertied income groups￿ lay behind the fall in income inequality.
12But if we believe that a more equal distribution of income and power ￿ or, more
vaguely, the birth of democracy ￿ lies behind the rise of monogamy we must ask:
what caused the transition from despotism/polygyny to democracy/monogamy?
2.3. How the father￿s status aﬀects the oﬀspring
Our theory is that diﬀerential reproductive success has worked as a force to di-
minish gaps in income and power. The idea is simple: if rich men have more
oﬀspring their wealth must be split up over time at a faster rate than that of the
less wealthy. This should not be interpreted too literally. Land estates are often
not divided equally among all sons, which has probably served the very purpose
of avoiding such dilution of the wealth (cf. Chu 1991). Still, unless we buy the
opposite extreme ￿ that every son who does not inherit is as bad oﬀ as if his
father had no wealth ￿ simple logic tells us that this equalizing force cannot help
but work. The issue is not whether all sons inherit the same amount of land but
whether there are any bene￿ts of being fathered by a rich man compared to a
poor. We argue that there are.
2.3.1. Legitimate children
In most human societies with property rights to land legitimately fathered sons
have had precedence in inheritance of the father￿s estate. Often the oldest son
would inherit most, or all, of the land ￿ a system called primogeniture. In that
respect, the six ￿pristine￿ civilizations did not diﬀer much from, for instance, me-
dieval Europe. However, other legitimate children were typically not left without
spoils altogether. From the birth of civilization, all the way up to medieval Eu-
rope, those of the ruler￿s legitimate oﬀspring who did not inherit would typically
join the intermediate classes: the military, the clergy, or some other bureaucracy
(Betzig 1993, 1995). These classes were not without power, and that power ul-
13timately rested on some form of land ownership. For example, disinherited sons
who joined the clergy in medieval Europe often arrived with some land attached.
If they rose in the Church hierarchy they could become just as rich and powerful
as any layman, and possibly father as many (but illegitimate) oﬀspring (Betzig
1995).
One may also argue that this is consistent with the fact that human societies
have evolved in a direction of increased ￿complexity,￿ with a growing number of
classes and levels of government in between the ruler and the agents at the bottom
of the distribution (Nolan and Lenski 1999, Ch. 6). When it comes to setting
up a model, we choose to have only two classes, landholders and landless, but we
may interpret the landholding class as including also e.g. the clergy, the military,
etc.
2.3.2. Illegitimate children
Also illegitimate children may bene￿t from their fathers￿ status. Again, this is
w h a tw ew o u l de x p e c t :n a t u r a ls e l e c t i o ns h o u l de n d o wm e nw i t ha ni n s t i n c tt o
help all their sons ￿ not only their legitimate ￿rst borns ￿ since they all carry the
fathers￿ genes.
When fathers did not leave them any bequests they did help their illegitimate
children in other ways. Consider some examples. Manumission of a slave is a
big transfer of wealth from the slaveowner to the slave. As a general rule slaves
fathered by the slavemaster tend to be better treated than other slaves, and more
likely to be freed. This pattern shows up among the Romans (Betzig 1992), in
the Americas (Davis 1966, Ch. 9), and in the Southern U.S (Clinton 1982, Ch.
11). In their classic ￿Time on the Cross,￿ Fogel and Engerman (1989, p. 132)
note that ￿mulattos￿ were much more common among freedmen and in the cities.
Other bene￿ts come more automatically. Genetically determined characteris-
14tics which have in￿uenced status in many societies ￿ skin color, intelligence, and
body size ￿ are inherited from the father. Also, among humans as well as neigh-
boring primate species, having a powerful father can buy protection against other
violent males.
3. The basic structure of the model
Consider the following overlapping-generations model. In every period t there is a
continuum of agents, each living for two periods: childhood and adulthood. Each
individual also belongs to either one of two sexes: male or female. In every period
t there are Pt adult men and equally many adult women. (In the same period
there are also Pt+1 boys and Pt+1 girls living in childhood.)
Men belong to either one of two classes: landowners, or rulers, and landless
subjects. In period t there are P R






t = Pt.( 3 . 1 )
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The total amount of land in productivity terms is denoted by M. Letting mt





.( 3 . 3 )
3.1. Human capital and income
A landowner￿s income is given by
15y
R
t = BHt + mt,( 3 . 4 )
where Ht denotes human capital, earning an income of B per unit.
We normalize output per unit of land to one, and mt (recall) denotes land
per landowner. This formulation can be thought of as short-hand for a simple
two-sector model: one sector uses only land, one only human capital, and both
have linear technologies.
As argued above, human capital has historically been more evenly distributed
than land. To capture this we here make the extreme assumption that Ht is
identical across classes, i.e., a public good. The landless thus earn
y
S
t = BHt.( 3 . 5 )
Human capital of generation t + 1 is built up according to
Ht+1 = AtHt + H.( 3 . 6 )
where At measures human capital productivity, i.e., how well knowledge is accu-
mulated from one generation to the next, and H constitutes the minimum level
of human capital.
3.2. Thinkers
We want to capture the idea that knowledge is accumulated through intellectual
activities, which are be performed only by agents who have the luxury of not being
forced to spend all their time and eﬀort working for their subsistence. One way to
model this would be through a time allocation decision between ￿thinking￿ and
￿working,￿ made subject to some subsistence consumption constraint. Only those
16who have a large enough non-labor income, and/or agents who need to work only
part time to survive, would be spending time thinking.
To simplify the analysis we instead postulate that intellectual activity is per-
formed by agents whose total income exceeds some threshold level, y.C a l ls u c h
agents thinkers, and denote their number by Xt,a sg i v e nb y
Xt =

     









.( 3 . 7 )
In other words, when only landowners￿ incomes exceed the threshold, only they
are thinkers; when the income of the landless (and thus also landowners) exceed
the threshold, they are all thinkers; and when not even the landowners￿ incomes
exceed the threshold, there are no thinkers.
Next, let human capital productivity, At, be a function of the number of
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where θ > 0a n dA∗ > 1 (ensuring that sustained human capital growth is possible
for high enough Xt). This functional form ensures that At is bounded from above
as the number of thinkers grows inde￿nitely.
3.3. Budget constraints and preferences
Let variables referring to agents belonging to the landowning and landless classes
be distinguished by the super-index i (i = S,R). Consumption takes place only
in adulthood and class-i consumption is denoted by ci
t, and (recall) a class-i agent
earns yi
t. Moreover, he has zi




t are continuous. Men invest qi
t units of the consumption good in each
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Preferences are given by
U
i














,( 3 . 1 0 )
where β ∈ (0,1) and si
t denotes the survival rate of each oﬀspring.
The exponent ρ(Ht) denotes the weight agents put on the quality (the survival
rate, si
t) of children, relative to quantity, zi
tni
t. W ea s s u m et h a tρ0(Ht) > 0,
i.e., parents with more human capital put a higher weight on their children￿s
quality. This is a convenient way of generating a quality-quantity substitution in
the course of economic development: in societies with more human capital parents
care more about the survival rate of their children. Another way to model the
same mechanisms would be to assume a higher return to investing in children￿s
health in societies where medical and other knowledge is greater.
3.4. The survival function
The function which determines the survival rate of each child is given by
s
i
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t = 0, i.e., in￿nite (or zero) quality
investment in children drives the survival rate of a child to 100 % (or zero). The
exponential functional form, together with the logarithmic utility function, will
give us nice closed-form solutions.
183.5. Male behavior
Maximizing utility in (3.10), subject to the consumption budget constraint in
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Using (3.12) and (3.13) we see that
q
i
t = ρ(Ht), (3.14)
i.e., quality investment depends only on the weight on quality in the utility func-
tion, ρ(Ht). This in turn is a function of human capital, which is assumed to be
the same across classes. Thus, the survival rate is identical across classes, so we
can disregard the index i,a n dw r i t e
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3.6. Allocation of women
Women choose which man to marry, choosing among all men. We assume that
women marry so as to maximize the number of surviving oﬀspring, which is given
by stni
t. [Recall from (3.15) that st is the same across classes.] Using the bud-
get constraint in (3.9), together with the ￿rst-order condition in (3.12), and the
optimal choice of qi
t in (3.14), we see that per-woman fertility, ni
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19which is increasing in the income of the man, and falling in the number of wives
he has. As a consequence, women simply allocate themselves so as to equalize the
income-per-wife ratio (yi
t/zi
t)a c r o s sm e n .T h u sni
t i st h es a m ea c r o s sc l a s s e s ,s o
we can suppress the subindex i, i.e., nR
t = nS
t = nt.
3.7. Marriage market equilibrium
Each of the P i
t members in class i marries zi
t wives (i = R,S). Total demand




t , and total supply is given by the total
number of women, which is the same as the total number of men, Pt. Setting




t λt + z
S
t (1 − λt) = 1. (3.17)
Next, setting ni













,( 3 . 1 8 )
where the second equality uses the expressions for yR
t and yS
t in (3.4) and (3.5).













.( 3 . 2 0 )
This result can be seen as a special case of Proposition 6 in Bergstrom (1994a).
It tells us that wives per man in each respective class is proportional to how
m u c ht h ec l a s sm e m b e r s ￿i n c o m e sd e v i a t ef r o mt h em e a n . T h em e a ni n c o m ei n
20the population is given by the denominators in (3.19) and (3.20), i.e., the sum
of income from human capital, BHt, which is the same across classes, and the
mean income from landholdings, λtmt = M/Pt [see (3.2) and (3.3)]. Note that
the average number of wives is one, which must hold whenever there are equally
many men as women, but since there are only two classes there is no man who
has exactly one wife.
4. Dynamics
4.1. Class dynamics
T h en u m b e ro fm a l eo ﬀspring of landowners is zR
t ntst/2. (Half of the children are
sons, half are daughters.) We assume that the only way to become a member of
the landowning class is to be born into it (and being a man). If landowners have
slow reproduction rates, i.e. if zR
t ntst/2 < 1, the next generation of landowners
will be fewer than the preceding. That is, if each landowner has less than one son
all sons stay in the landowning class, and PR
t falls over time.
If zR
t ntst/2 ≥ 1, it is not clear what fraction of the sons should inherit. The
most natural theoretical approach would be to assume that landowners allocate
land among sons in order to maximize their sons￿ reproductive success, i.e., the
total number of grandchildren their sons produce. In that case it can be seen that
father is then indiﬀerent as to how the land is allocated. Intuitively, concentrating
the inheritance to fewer oﬀspring implies higher income and higher reproductive
success for those who do inherit ￿ but, trivially, that higher reproductive success
is allocated to fewer sons. In our model, these eﬀects cancel: the total number a
grandchildren is the same, only reared by diﬀerent sons.8
8Chu (1991) provides a theoretical analysis of a father￿s optimal allocation of bequests among
his oﬀspring, but without any explicit modelling of diﬀerential reproductive success.
21Nor is it empirically clear what is a right assumption to make here. Assuming
perfect primogeniture (letting only one son inherit) implies that the remaining
oﬀspring move to the landless class. Such extreme social mobility was rarely
observed in early human civilizations. Rather, those of the ruler￿s oﬀspring who
did not inherit joined intermediate classes, such as the military, or clergy; they
would rarely be left without any spoils altogether (e.g. Betzig 1993). This is
also consistent with the fact that human societies have evolved in a direction of
increased complexity and strati￿cation, with a growing number of classes and
levels of government (Nolan and Lenski 1999, Ch. 6). For that reason, we believe
that imperfect primogeniture is a better assumption.
More precisely, we let the number of landowners in period t+1begivenbythe
sum of (1) the P R
t legitimate heirs of generation t; and (2) some (small) fraction



























t ntst/2 ≥ 1
.( 4 . 1 )
Note that δ = 0 amounts to perfect primogeniture, keeping the size of the land-
holding class constant (P R
t+1 = PR
t ). The second term in the second line in (4.1)
can thus be thought of as ￿leakage￿ into the landholding class of agents who would
join the landless class under perfect primogeniture.
4.2. Population dynamics
Every woman has (ntst)/2 surviving sons, and equally many daughters, so the
total number of men (and the total number of women) in the economy grows at
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22Setting ni








,( 4 . 3 )
where the second equality uses (3.2) and (3.3) to note that λtmt = M/Pt, i.e.,
average land income equals the total amount of land divided by the total number
of people. As seen, the fertility rate is rising in the average income, BHt +M/Pt,
and falling in the quality preference, ρ(Ht).
Using (4.2) and (4.3), together with the expression for the survival rate, st =















Pt.( 4 . 4 )
4.3. The phase diagram with constant landowning class
To understand the workings of the model we ￿rst keep human capital productivity
￿xed, and denote it by A0. This could be thought of as a society with perfect pri-
mogeniture, implying that the size of the landowning class (and thus the number
of thinkers, Xt) is constant.
To draw a phase diagram we derive the loci along which population and human














.( 4 . 5 )
Setting Ht+1 = Ht in (3.6) we see that ∆Ht =0w h e n
230 = t H ∆








Figure 4.1: The phase diagram.
Ht =
H
1 − A0.( 4 . 6 )
The dynamics are shown in Figure 4.1. The economy converges to a unique
globally stable steady-state equilibrium where human capital and population are
both non-growing. A small one-time increase in the number of thinkers leads to
an increase in human-capital productivity, A0,s h i f t i n go u tt h e( ∆Ht =0 ) - l o c u s ,
thus raising the steady-state levels of population and human capital.
Even though population is constant, meaning that every man has one son,
landholders father more sons than the landless, i.e., diﬀerential reproductive suc-
24cess is at play. If we allow for some leakage into the landholding class this would
make the number of thinkers (and thus A0) slowly increase, and the (∆Ht =0 ) -
locus shift to the right. In that sense, we can call the steady-state equilibrium in
Figure 4.1 temporary (cf. Galor and Weil 2000): it assumes a constant number of
agents with incomes above y ￿ i.e., a constant number of thinkers.
As the (∆Ht = 0)-locus continues to move to the right the equilibrium human
capital level reaches B/y. At this point, human capital is abundant enough to
enable landless agents to start thinking. At this point human capital will begin
to exhibit sustained growth. The model thus has the feature that changes may
come slowly for a long time and then accelerate.
4.3.1. A hunter-gatherer society
Let us analyze more closely the link between the income levels of each class and
the number of thinkers. Consider ￿rst a society without property rights to land ￿ a
hunter-gatherer society ￿ implying that all men in eﬀect belong to the landholding
class: PR
t = Pt. If human capital is low and population large, no man earns above
the threshold level for thinking, i.e., BHt+M/Pt < y. Thus there are no thinkers
in the economy (Xt = 0) and human capital productivity, [given by (3.7)] is
zero. Human capital is thus stuck at H, and the associated steady-state level of
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< y,( 4 . 8 )
which holds for low enough H and/or high enough y.
25Note that increased agricultural productivity (M) leads to larger population
but not higher per-capita income as long as the economy stays in this steady
state (i.e., as long as all land is evenly distributed). In that sense, inequality is a
necessary condition for the economy to leave the hunter-gatherer stage.
4.3.2. Early civilizations
If a small enough fraction of the population establishes property rights to the
land, the income of each landowner rises above the threshold for thinking: the
class of landowners becomes a class of thinkers. This captures the creation of an
early human civilization, both because such a society is less equal than a hunter-
gatherer society, and because it has more human capital, since the number of
thinkers is positive.
An increase in the size of the landowning class now has two eﬀects on landowner
income, pulling in opposite directions: (1) landowner income falls since each agent
h a sl e s sl a n d( M/PR
t is lower); and (2) landowners and landless alike earn more,
since there being more thinkers implies higher human capital productivity, and
more human capital for all.
To pursue this analysis conjecture ￿rst that Xt is equal to the landowning
population, P R
t .W ec a nt h e ne x a m i n ei ft h i si si n d e e dt h ec a s eb yl o o k i n ga tt h e
associated income levels of the two classes (in the temporary steady state) and
compare them to y.
Start by using (3.6) and (3.8) to derive an expression for the temporary steady-
state level of human capital as a function of the number of thinkers, Xt,u n d e r
t h ec o n j e c t u r et h a tXt = P R





H(θ + P R
t )
θ − PR
t [A∗ − 1]
,( 4 . 9 )
26w h e r ew er e c a l lt h a tA∗ > 1, implying that H0(P R
t ) > 0.9 Using (4.9), together
with (3.4) and (3.3), we can then write income levels (in the temporary steady-
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and ￿rst term in (4.10) constitutes the income of the landless: yS
t = BH(PR
t ).
Figure 4.2 shows how income of the two classes depend on P R
t . The parametric
example is that in Table 4.1, and the curves for landowners￿ incomes refer to two
levels of land, M.
The landless￿ incomes increase monotonically with P R
t , since more landowners
implies more thinkers and thus more human capital. The income of the landown-
e r si sU - s h a p e d ,r e ￿ecting the two countervailing forces mentioned above: more
landowners means less income from land per landowner, but also more thinkers
and thus more human capital income. The ￿gure also displays the threshold for
thinking, y. As seen there is a region of levels of PR
t in which the number of
thinkers, Xt, equals the size of the landholding class, PR
t (as we conjectured).
Moreover, letting P R
t expand exogenously in this region we see what path the
economy will follow if we let diﬀerential reproductive success feed into changes in
class structure.
4.3.3. An industrial revolution and a demographic transition
Consider ￿rst the case with a high level of land productivity, M =2 .75. In this
case, landowner income always exceeds the threshold for thinking, y.I ft h ei n c o m e
of the landless exceeds y the landless are also thinkers. The number of thinkers
9This means that suﬃciently many thinkers can generate sustained growth in human capital
[see (3.8) again], i.e., H(PR
t ) →∞as PR
t → θ/[A∗ − 1].
27Figure 4.2: Income levels for landowners (yR
t ) and landless (yS
t ) in the temporary
steady state, as a function of the size of the landowning class, PR
t .
28thus makes a discrete jump as PR
t reaches a critical level. Thus, slow and gradual
increases in P R
t generate initially slow and gradual changes in human capital, and
then a spurt: an industrial revolution.
We can understand this process in terms of Figure 4.1: a slowly rising number
of thinkers shifts out the (∆Ht = 0)-locus. At some point in time the locus passes
the critical level B/y, the point at which non-land income exceeds the threshold
for thinking, and the economy goes through an industrial revolution.
As human capital starts growing, the weight on quality, ρ(Ht), rises. This
leads to a quality-quantity shift in children: a fall in mortality and ￿ with a slight
lag ￿ fertility, with an associated spike in population growth in between. Again,
the way we have drawn the phase diagram in Figure 4.1 explains why. Note that
the (∆Pt = 0)-locus becomes asymptotically horizontal, implying that population
b e c o m e sc o n s t a n ti nl e v e l sa sh u m a nc a p i t a lg o e st oi n ￿nity. (This need not be
the case, but it holds for e.g. the numerical example in Table 4.1.) Since sustained
growth in human capital pushes mortality to zero [recall (3.15)] the new constant
population level must be associated with a lower rate of fertility: a demographic
transition must has taken place.
Note also that the vertical distance between landowners￿ and landless￿ incomes
is falling in PR
t . This implies that the gap in reproductive success falls as we
increase the size of the landholding class: society becomes more monogamous.
4.3.4. The downfall of a civilization
With low land productivity, M =1 .75, the diluting eﬀects of a growing landown-
ing class will at some stage push landowners￿ incomes below the threshold, so
that all thinkers vanish and human capital falls to its minimum, H:t h e c i v i -
lization goes under. From there on, population slowly approaches the long-run
hunter-gatherer level, given in (4.7). As long as landowners have higher incomes,
29B β k1 k2 M θ A∗ H y PR
0 H0 P0 δ
5 .99 2 4.995 2.75 12 30 1 20 .05 1.14 0.44 .005
Table 4.1: Parameter values
and thus higher reproductive success, the landowning class keeps growing. In
the limit all agents become landowners, i.e., the society reverts to an egalitarian
hunter-gatherer structure.
4.4. Numerical simulations
To understand better how the diﬀerent components of the model interact we
next demonstrate the same two simple examples (an industrial revolution and the
downfall of a civilization), but now letting PR
t change endogenously, according to
(4.1).
We do this numerically, so we ￿rst need to specify a functional form for the
quality-preference function, ρ(Ht):
ρ(Ht)=k1 + k2Ht,( 4 . 1 1 )
where k1,k 2 > 0.
The parameter values are chosen as in Table 4.1. (We do not try to ￿tt h e
model to any data; these numbers are just for illustration.) We choose the values
for k2, β,a n dB so that the fertility rate in (4.3) converges to 2 as human capital
goes to in￿nity, i.e., we set k2 = Bβ/2. Since the survival rate goes to unity [see
(3.15)], each couple having two surviving children implies a constant population.
Given these parameter values, we let the initial number of landowners, P R
0 ,b e
.05. As seen from Figure 4.2 (which uses the same parameter values) landowner
income thus exceeds the threshold, ensuring that the economy starts oﬀ with a
positive number of thinkers. The initial level of human capital is calculated from
30(4.9); then initial population can be derived from (4.5). We can calculate the
initial fraction of the population who are landowners, λ0,a s.05/.44 ≈ 11%.
Given these initial values we then simulate the path the economy follows over
time. Since δ > 0 the landowning class grows over time ￿ see (4.1) ￿ which sets
the dynamics in motion as described above. The path referring to the values in
Table 4.1 is shown in Figure 4.3; Figure 4.4 then shows the eﬀects of a lower M.
4.4.1. An industrial revolution and a demographic transition
Figure 4.3 displays the time path when M =2 .75. The diagram in the upper left
corner illustrates incomes of the two classes. (Note that the rise in the size of
the landowning class essentially corresponds to moving along the horizontal axis
in Figure 4.2). The gap between landowners￿ and landless￿ incomes diminishes
over time. This income compression proceeds ￿rst slowly, and the gap vanishes
when the human capital growth takes oﬀ, since human capital is identical across
classes. Inequality in the number of women just re￿ects inequality in income so
this process mirrors also society￿s mating patterns. Consistent with the descrip-
tion in Section 2, polygyny therefore declines slowly at ￿rst; then society becomes
fully monogamous relatively rapidly as sustained income growth sets in.
At the very point in time when incomes shoot oﬀ into sustained growth we see
how higher levels of human capital also generate a sharp fall in mortality, and ￿
with a slight lag ￿ fertility, as shown in the upper right diagram.10 In between,
the growth rate of population leaps up, as seen in the lower left diagram.11 At the
10The fertility rate is calculated as nt/2 − 1. (This would be the population growth rate if
all children survived; the mother dies after the adult phase and she has nt/2d a u g h t e r s . )T h e
mortality rate is calculated as 1 − st. Note that population is constant when stnt/2=1 ,s o
nt/2 − 1 need not equal 1 − st when population is constant.
11There is an increase in the vertical distance between the fertility and mortality curves around
generation 600, but it is hard to see.
31same time growth in per-capita income (i.e., the change in BHt+M/Pt) jumps up
and then stabilizes at a sustained positive rate. This also ￿ts with the description
in Section 2 (see Figure 2.1).
4.4.2. The downfall of a civilization
Consider next the same economy, but with lower land productivity (M equal to
1.75, instead of 2.75). As seen from Figure 4.2 this means that at some point in
time landowner income falls below the threshold, implying that all thinkers vanish.
Human capital drops to H and stays there forever. As a result, the mortality rate
rises. So does the fertility rate, due to a reversed quality-quantity switch following
the fall in human capital, a sort of reversed demographic transition. In between
there is a sharp dip in population growth to negative numbers.
At the new stable levels of population and human capital the landowning class
is still growing, and the landless class is shrinking, due to the higher reproductive
success of the landowners and the assumption of imperfect primogeniture. In the
long run the economy thus converges to an equal hunter-gatherer state in which all
agents are landowners, and have the same income. This society thus also becomes
fully monogamous.
5. Conclusions
We have presented a two-sex long-run growth model, aiming to explain a number
of institutional, demographic, and economic changes in human societies since the
birth of mankind. One driving force in our model is the universal human pattern
of diﬀerential reproductive success across men: rich men have more oﬀspring.
Another is that the accumulation of human capital increases with the number of
people engaged in intellectual activities, ￿thinking,￿ and that this activity occurs
32Figure 4.3: A path leading to an industrial revolution and a demographic transi-
tion.
33Figure 4.4: A path leading to the demise of an early civilization.
34only among the very rich. A third assumption is that land is a more excludable
resource than knowledge, so that land can be more unequally distributed than
human capital. We let a society start oﬀ with an egalitarian (hunter-gatherer)
structure with small diﬀerences in landholdings. All agents are poor, and there
are thus no thinkers, and little human capital. An exogenous rise in agricultural
technology ￿ and/or a reallocation of land holdings into the hands of a few agents
￿ sets in motion a process which at some point sparks an industrial revolution
and a demographic transition.
The process leading up to these events is characterized by shrinking income
gaps between landholders and landless. Mirroring this trend the distribution
of women becomes more equal: society becomes more monogamous. This ￿ts
with the historical evidence which we cite. Mating was polygynous up until the
time when human societies ￿ starting with Western Europe ￿ began developing
democratic institutions, and income inequality started to fall.
An obvious objection is that the society we live in today is not completely
monogamous. Our model society becomes fully monogamous in the limit, as in-
come gaps go to zero, because land becomes less important as a source of income
than human capital, and by assumption human capital is completely equally dis-
tributed. This result should not be interpreted literally. If we allow for some gaps
in human capital levels the model would instead generate a steady-state income
gap, with an associated steady-state degree of polygyny.
We have assumed the productivity adjusted size of land, M, to be constant.
If land productivity, i.e. M, grew at some exogenous rate the landholding class￿
earnings from land would rise over time, which would serve to widen income gaps.
At the same time, this would increase also the gap in reproductive success between
landless and landholders, which would amplify the force working to equalize the
land distribution. It would also generate faster growth in the size of the land-
35holding class, PR
t , which would raise the human capital growth rate, and hasten
the industrial revolution. This would be consistent with the ￿ndings by Burkett,
Humblet and Putterman (1999) that an early agricultural revolution makes the
industrial revolution set in sooner.
Many of the mechanisms driving our model can be substituted for by other,
more realistic, forces. These may work diﬀerently but pull in similar directions.
The underlying story should still have some truth to it, unless we believe it to
be a coincidence that the rise in income equality, the birth of monogamy and
democracy, and the spurt in per-capita income growth rates, all took place around
the same time. That is, following the rise of agriculture and civilization it took
several hundred generations before these events occurred, and they all took place
within a time span of, say, a couple of generations. Whether or not our answer
is the right one, this seems to be a question worth addressing in the context of
long-run growth theory.
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